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Abstract
Indirect Exporters are defined as firms exporting through a trade inter-
mediary. Despite numerous recent appearances in theoretical work, empir-
ical evidence comparing these firms to uniquely domestic firms and Direct
Exporters does not exist. I show that in Eastern Europe these firms do, as
predicted by the theoretical literature, lie between domestic firms and Direct
Exporters for a range of performance measures. The “Direct Exporter pre-
mium” is the more robust finding, while certain ambiguity surrounding the
productivity gap between Indirect Exporters and Domestic firms indicates
that these two groups may not be as significantly different.
JEL: F10, F14
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1 Introduction
The role played by intermediaries in international trade is a topic of growing inter-
est. The literature has provided ample evidence, across countries of varying levels
of economic development, that these firms account for a significant portion of trade
flows.1 These studies have been accompanied by a range of papers modeling inter-
national trade as involving more than uniquely exporting firms in one country and
consumers in another.
This theoretical treatment of the role of trade intermediaries has usually in-
volved either network or matching frameworks2 or extensions of the model of Melitz
(2003).3 In Blum et al. (2009), the largest firms choose a direct distribution tech-
nology to reach foreign consumers themselves. Less productive firms choose an
intermediation technology by pairing up with large trading firms to export indi-
rectly. In Ahn et al. (2010) the fixed cost of selling to an intermediary in the firm’s
own country is lower than the fixed cost of exporting directly. This leads to an iden-
tical sorting to that in Blum et al. (2009) where the most productive firms export
directly, less productive firms export through intermediaries, and the least produc-
tive active firms sell on the domestic market only (termed here “Domestic firms”).
Akerman (2010) models wholesalers as having an advantage through economies of
scope, i.e. they smooth the fixed cost of selling abroad across many products. He
then shows that wholesalers will export a lower volume but more products, and
predicts that the sorting mentioned above will hold. Felbermayer and Jung (2009)
present a slightly different set-up, focusing on the hold-up problem. They also
predict the same sorting pattern as the above three papers.
To the best of my knowledge, empirical evidence on the productivity sorting
present in the above-mentioned models does not exist.4 In each paper mentioned
1Ahn et al. (2010) find that intermediaries account for 20 percent of Chinese exports in 2005.
Blum et al. (2010) report that around 35 percent of imports into Chile from Argentina are
mediated through wholesalers, with 6 percent through retailers. Akerman (2010) shows that in
Sweden in 2005, roughly half of firms exporting goods were wholesalers, while these wholesalers
accounted for 15 percent of export volume. Bernard et al. (2010) show that in Italy, 27 per
cent of manufacturing exporters are wholesalers, accounting for 11 percent of export volume in
2003. Felbermayr and Jung (2009) show at industry level for the US that the ratio of exports
to intermediaries over exports to foreign affiliates is almost always larger than one, and often by
orders of magnitude. Bernard, Jensen et al. (2010) show that in the US, “mixed wholesaler-
retailers”, i.e. firms with more than 75 percent of output in those categories, account for two
thirds of US exports in 2002.
2See Antra`s and Costinot (2010), Blum et al. (2009), who use a Melitz setting, Petropoulou
(2007) or Rauch and Watson (2004).
3See Abel-Koch (2010), Ahn et al. (2010), Akerman (2010) or Felbermayr and Jung (2009).
4Abel-Koch (2010) is the most closely related study to the current paper. She shows that firm
size negatively predicts the share of indirect exports in total sales, suggesting that as fims get
larger they are more likely to export directly.
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above, the empirical analysis focuses on issues relating to the intermediaries them-
selves, rather than to the indirectly exporting firms. The aim of this paper is to
inform this growing literature on the validity of the productivity sorting results
generated by each model. Due to a lack of panel data, I cannot ascertain cleanly
whether the productivity sorting is due to selection into export modes or learning
from exporting. The purpose of this study is rather to inform the literature on the
relative performance of these three types of firms.
We see from probit analysis that Indirect Exporters are more likely than Do-
mestic firms to import, to be foreign owned, to license foreign technology, to be
multi-product firms, and to engage in R&D. We also see that Direct Exporters are
more likely to engage in most of the above than Indirect Exporters. This suggests
support for the performance hierarchy mentioned above. On productivity, the re-
sults presented here again suggest that it is valid to assume that Direct Exporters
are more productive than both Indirect Exporters and Domestic firms. On the other
hand, the assumption that Indirect Exporters are more productive than Domestic
firms receives weaker support. In terms of sales and domestic sales, these firms
exporting through intermediaries are indeed shown to perform more strongly than
purely domestic firms. Using logged output per worker as a measure of produc-
tivity, however, the hypothesis that Indirect Exporters are more productive than
Domestic firms is shown to not hold. Using a broader definition of Indirect Ex-
porter, however, the productivity hierarchy presented by the theoretical literature
is shown to hold perfectly as predicted.
The overall message of the paper is that, while there is a certain ambiguity on
the advantage of Indirect Exporters, the overwhelming evidence is in support of the
hierarchy predicted by the emerging theoretical literature.
The paper proceeds with a description of the data (Section 2), empirical analysis
(Section 3) and a conclusion (Section 4).
2 Data
The data used come from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS), which is collected by The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and The World Bank. This database collects information
on, inter alia, a firm’s sales, exports, imports, outsourcing, employment, wages,
ownership, investment and opinions on corruption and institutional quality. Data
are collected for most countries in Eastern Europe for 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008 and
2009. The authors (EBRD and World Bank, 2010) state that “the survey universe
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was defined as commercial, service or industrial business establishments with at
least five full-time employees”. The statistical sampling technique used is stratified
random sampling. The three levels of stratification used were industry, establish-
ment size and region. Table 1 of the latest report (EBRD and World Bank, 2010)
shows that for the total country sample, over 98 percent of the target number of
interviews were achieved.
Figures for nominal monetary variables are given in local currency units. I
normalize these variables by converting them to US dollar figures using the mean
yearly exchange rate from the IMF International Financial Statistics database. The
data show that full country coverage was only carried out in 2002, 2005 and 2009.
There are just under 30,000 observations in the data altogether, with wider coverage
for large countries such as Russia, Turkey and Poland.
3 Empirical evidence on characteristics of Indi-
rect Exporters
The aim of this paper is to give a first portrait of Indirect Exporters (IE hereon).
Firms in the BEEPS are asked “what percentage of establishment’s sales were in-
direct exports (sold domestically to a third party that exports products)”, as well
as “what percentage of sales were direct exports”. For the purposes of the current
paper, a firm is Domestic (D hereon) if it has 100 percent of its sales in the domestic
market, an IE if some of its sales are in the form of indirect exports but none are
direct exports, and a Direct Exporter (DE hereon) if it has some sales in the form of
direct exports. Table 1 presents the occurrence of each of these three types of firm.
Among the DE are 943 firms that have some direct and some indirect exports. I
code these as DE due to the fact that, in the world of Melitz-type models, a firm ex-
porting though both modes must have overcome the higher fixed costs of exporting
directly. We see that the majority of firms are domestic firms, as would be expected
given previous evidence.5 Among exporting firms, the majority of these are DE,
with only 3 percent of firms exporting through a trade intermediary. This suggests
that the intermediate productivity range in which IE lie in the theoretical literature
is a small one in reality. Looking at these firms’ share in total sales, we see that
IE are twice as important as their frequency would suggest, and unsurprisingly, DE
account for a much larger share of sales than their frequency would suggest. We also
see that, for both IE and DE, indirect and direct exports, respectively, account for
5Bernard et al. (2007) show that in the US 18 percent of manufacturing firms engaged in
exporting in 2002.
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roughly 40 percent of total sales, while DE sell on average 3 percent of their total
sales through indirect exports. This indicates that once firms have overcome the
costs of exporting directly, indirect exports form a negligible part of their activity.
Table 1: Observations, Relative Frequency, Group Share in Total Sample Sales,
Share of Export Types in Firms’ Sales
Firm Type Observations (Rel. Freq.) Share of Total Ind. Exp./Sales Dir. Exp./Sales
Sample Sales
Domestic 20,848 (.76) .3796 0 0
Indirect Exporters 887 (.03) .0610 .3867 0
Direct Exporters 5,825 (.21) .5593 .0341 .4032
Source: BEEPS
If we relax our definition of IE, we see that firms engaging in indirect exports
are more important than as appears in Table 1. If we define IE as any firm engaging
in indirect exports (even if they also export directly), and DE as firms that only
export directly, we see that 7% of firms are IE and 18% are DE. Changing this
definition, however, only alters the sales shares of the two groups by one percent
each. If we remove the firms that export both directly and through a wholesaler
and include only “pure” IE and DE, we again see that frequencies and sales shares
change very little.
3.1 Distributions of Exporters
I now present Kernel density plots of firm performance measures for my three cat-
egories of exporter. In Figure 1 we see that IE lie clearly between D and DE for
logged total sales. As a more accurate proxy for firm productivity, I use logged
output per worker. The Kernel density plots for logged output per worker in Figure
2 show that, in the lower part of the distribution, the sorting pattern predicted by
the theoretical literature holds. The lower productivity of domestic firms relative
to both types of exporter is confirmed at all points in the distribution. As we move
up to larger values of logged output per worker, however, we see that there are
some points at which the distributions of IE and DE touch, and even cross. The
broad pattern, however, is still one in keeping with the predictions of the theoretical
literature. Table 4 in the Appendix reports Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality
of distributions. We see from this table that the distributions for both IE and DE
lie significantly to the right of those for the rest of the sample, and that the distri-
bution for DE lies to the right of that for IE. This offers continued support for the
performance hierarchy set out throughout the paper.
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Figure 1: Kernel densities of logged total sales
Figure 2: Kernel densities of logged sales per worker
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3.2 Simple Regression Analysis
In this section I engage in simple regression analysis to estimate the “performance
premia” for each exporter type. Table 2 gives a more in-depth picture of the char-
acteristics of the different type of exporters. I run five probit regressions which give
the probability for IE and DE relative to D firms of participating in the following:
importing, having a foreign owner, licensing of foreign technology, Research and
Development (R&D) and multi-product sales. Formally I run
Pr(Yit = 1) = IndirectExpit +DirectExpit + δc + δt + δs (1)
where Y = 1 if a firm engages in each of the five variables mentioned above and
0 otherwise, IndirectExpit is a dummy for IE, DirectExpit is a dummy for DE,
and the other controls are country, time and sector dummies. I then run four OLS
regressions of the form
Xit = IndirectExpit +DirectExpit + δc + δt + δs (2)
where Xit will be logged sales, logged domestic sales, logged output per worker and
employment. From the probit regressions in Table 2 we see that IE and DE are
more likely to be engaged in all the activities mentioned above than domestic firms.
This confirms the theoretical literature’s prediction that domestic firms sit at the
bottom of a performance hierarchy. These probit regressions also give credence to
the predictions of the theoretical literature on the relation between IE and DE.
For importing, being foreign owned and engaging in R&D, the likelihood of partic-
ipation is statistically significantly higher for DE than IE. For licensing of foreign
technology and for being a multi-product firm, the marginal effect is larger for IE,
but the chi-squared test cannot reject equality of coefficients between the two types
of exporter. Using OLS regressions, Table 2 tells us again that for sales, local sales
and employment (l), the hierarchy predicted by the theoretical literature holds in
its entirety, with the regression coefficients showing that DE and IE lie both sig-
nificantly above D firms, and the F test showing that the difference in coefficients,
with DE being greater than IE, is statistically significant. For logged output per
worker, we find that DE are statistically significantly more productive than both
IE and D firms, but the data do not give a significant difference in logged output
per worker between IE and D firms.
Table 2 gives the strong overall impression of a performance hierarchy of firms:
DE are the most productive firms, followed by IE, followed by D firms. These re-
sults suggest that the theoretical result of an intermediate productivity for those
exporting through a trade intermediary seems an accurate approximation, although
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the “Indirect Exporter premium” is less robust, as evidenced by column (9). The
extremely robust nature of the “Direct Exporter premium” suggests that trade
intermediaries do indeed lower entry costs to exporting, so that only the top per-
forming firms enter as DE. On the other hand, the less robust nature of the “Indirect
Exporter premium” may suggest that intermediaries lower entry costs to such an
extent that entry costs for IE are not statistically different to those to domestic
production.
We now relax our definition of IE, to allow all firms that export indirectly,
regardless of whether they also export directly, to be considered IE, and restrict
our definition of DE to firms that only export directly. In Table 3, the regressions
of Table 2 are replicated with this new definition of IE and DE. In probit regressions,
DE are still more likely to be foreign-owned than IE, who have a higher likelihood
than D firms. For R&D and importing, we no longer see a significant difference
between IE and DE. IE are now more likely to be multi-product firms than DE.
The OLS regressions return the same results as before: for logged sales, logged local
sales and employment (l), the expected hierarchy holds. The key difference between
Table 3 and Table 2 lies in Column (9), where the coefficient on logged output per
worker now tells us that IE, when defined in this more broad way, are indeed more
productive than D firms, although only at the five percent level of significance.
When moving from the narrow definition of IE, we do indeed see that the hierarchy
proposed by the current theoretical literature holds in the data even for our best
proxy for productivity. The weaker statistical significance again suggests that the
“Indirect Exporter premium” is the least robust of the relationships in the hierarchy.
From Tables 2 and 3, the overwhelming picture is one in which firms exporting
directly are more productive than firms exporting through a trade intermediary,
who are in turn more productive than firms serving only the domestic market. The
less robust nature of the latter relationship indicates that a certain caution should
be exerted when assuming such a productivity hierarchy, but that on the whole the
sorting of firms predicted by the new theoretical literature on intermediated trade
is largely valid.
As a final robustness check, I address the worry that intermediary firms them-
selves may be driving some of the results. A reader may worry that wholesaling
firms are more likely to be DE and thus bias results. The data show that the dis-
tribution of D, IE and DE firms in the wholesaling industry (NACE2 51) is similar
to that shown across the dataset. I run all regressions and re-plot all densities
documented above, and see that absolutely all results are robust to the exclusion
of firms categorized in NACE2 industry 51.
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Table 2: Portrait of exporter types, Base Category is Domestic firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS
Importer Foreign For. Tech Multi Prod. R&D l ln(Sales) ln(Dom Sales) Lab. Prod.
Indirect Exporter 0.264*** 0.116*** 0.043*** 0.103*** 0.159*** .774*** .781*** .366*** .032
(16.01) (7.12) (4.22) ( 4.92) (7.04) (14.85) (10.07) (4.37) (0.58)
Direct Exporter 0.307*** 0.187*** 0.038*** 0.081*** 0.204*** 1.168*** 1.437*** .724*** .290***
(37.19) (25.92) (8.48) (8.35) (19.61) (49.08) (39.19) (18.76) (11.04)
N 18715 26036 13937 20544 17338 26403 21015 20486 20977
Chi-Sq (probit) or F-test (OLS) for equality of coefficients between IE and DE
Chi-Sq or F 5.59 16.01 0.16 0.87 3.37 52.95 67.33 17.04 20.28
p-value 0.018** 0.000*** 0.689 0.351 0.066* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001***
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Year, Country, Sector dummies included in all regressions
marginal effects reported for probit regressions
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Table 3: Portrait of exporter types, Base Category is Domestic firms. Indirect Exporters defined more broadly.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS
Importer Foreign For. Tech Multi Prod. R&D l ln(Sales) ln(Dom Sales) Lab. Prod.
Indirect Exporter 0.309*** 0.136*** 0.046*** 0.140*** 0.198*** 1.012*** 1.082*** 0.437*** 0.105*
(27.21) (11.10) (5.98) (9.06) (12.03) (26.31) (18.74) (7.13) (2.54)
Direct Exporter 0.293*** 0.198*** 0.038*** 0.064*** 0.202*** 1.152*** 1.442*** 0.761*** 0.308***
(34.07) (25.25) (7.82) (6.19) (18.03) (45.87) (37.40) (18.72) (11.16)
Chi-Sq (probit) or F-test (OLS) for equality of coefficients between IE and DE
Chi-Sq or F 1.39 18.23 .66 16.81 .03 11.21 33.92 24.10 21.02
p-value 0.2389 0.000*** 0.4168 0.000*** 0.8611 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
t statistics in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Year, Country, Sector dummies included in all regressions
marginal effects reported for probit regressions
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4 Conclusion
I have presented first evidence on the performance of Indirect Exporters. In con-
cordance with the predictions of recent theoretical models, Indirect Exporters are
found to lie between Domestic firms and Direct Exporters for a number of firm per-
formance measures. The premium of Direct Exporters is unambiguous throughout
the paper, whereas that of Indirect Exporters over Domestic firms is supported,
but slightly less robust. This suggests, first of all, that intermediaries do certainly
lower the fixed cost of exporting, as purported in the literature. Secondly, the fixed
cost reductions made possible by trade intermediaries may be hugely economically
significant, with the potential that they leave Indirect Exporters and firms serving
only the domestic market not significantly differing. These findings can help mo-
tivate and validate current and future research regarding the role of intermediaries
in mediating international trade.
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A Appendix
Table 4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions
Tests for logged sales Tests for logged sales per worker
Difference P-value Difference P-value
Indirect Exporter vs Domestic .2576 0.000 .1511 0.000
Direct Exporter vs Domestic .3799 0.000 .2072 0.000
Direct Exporter vs Indirect Exporter .1480 0.000 .0800 0.000
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